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Drew: Civil Rico: Liability Constructed to Effectuate Its Remedial Purp

CIVIL RICO: LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO
EFFECTUATE ITS REMEDIAL PURPOSE
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., et al, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985)
Petitioner filed an action against its joint venture partner' under the Federal
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 2 Petitioner alleged violations based on predicate acts of mail and wire fraud.3 The trial court dismissed
the action for failure to allege a distinct racketeering injury.4 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment and further required a
prior criminal conviction of the underlying predicate acts. 5 The United States
Supreme Court reversed and HELD, the plain language of RICO requires
neither a distinct racketeering injury nor a prior criminal conviction of the
6
underlying predicate acts.
In 1970, Congress enacted RICO to curtail syndicated crime by enhancing
sanctions and providing new civil remedies. 7 Civil RICO created a private right
of action for treble damages and attorney's fees for injury to business or property
arising from a violation of the Act.' Used sparingly in the 1970's, civil RICO's
acceptance accelerated and threatened to displace pre-existing statutory and common law remedies. 9 Disturbed by pervasive civil RICO claims and concomitant

1.

105 S. Ct. 3275, 3279 (1985). Petitioner, a Belgian corporation, filed suit against re-

spondent, a New York corporation, alleging, inter alia, violations of 18 U.S.C. 9 1962(c). Petitioner
and respondent were joint venturers with an agreement to share net profits. Petitioner alleged
respondent cheated it out of its fair share of the net profits by inflating expenses. Id.
2. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 55 19611968 (1982). The statute provides, in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
Id. § 1962(c). The statute further provides: "Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. S 1964(c).
3. 18 U.S.C. S 1961(1)(B) (1982). This section defines racketeering activity to include mail
and wire fraud as predicate acts necessary to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. Id.
4. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963, 965 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) aff'd, 741 F.2d
482 (2d Cir. 1984), reo'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
5. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 503-04 (2d Cir. 1984) rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
3275 (1985). Judge Oakes imposed this novel prior criminal conviction requirement. The decision
was 2-1 with a cogent dissent by Judge Cardamone. Id. at 504.

6. 105 S. Ct. at 3284-85. The Court also relied on the legislative history and underlying
policy in so ruling. Id.
7. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970) (Statement of Findings and Purpose). For
civil remedies see 18 U.S.C. S 1964(a)-(d) (1982).
8. 18 U.S.C. S 1964(c) (1982); see also supra note 2.
9. Of 270 district court RICO decisions prior to 1985, only three percent (nine cases) were
decided throughout the 1970s, two percent were decided in 1982, thirty-three percent in 1983,
forty-three percent in 1984. 105 S. Ct. at 3277 n.1 (citing the 1985 Report of the Ad Hoc Civil
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expansion of federal jurisdiction, many courts imposed standing requirements
limiting civil RICO's application. '
In Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc."' the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether a prior criminal conviction
of a predicate act was a prerequisite for standing. 2 The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant violated RICO through commercial bribery, mail fraud, and
interstate transportation in aid of racketeering." Relying on the language of
section 1964(c), the defendants argued the prior criminal conviction of alleged
predicate acts was an essential element of a civil RICO action.' 4 Section 1964(c)
provides that any person injured in his business or property by a violation of
section 1962 may recover treble damages and attorney's fees." Defendants reasoned that the word "violation," as used in section 1962, should be interpreted
to require a prior criminal conviction.", Contrasting civil RICO to the Clayton
Act's antitrust provisions, the defendants argued the differences in language
illustrated congressional intent to require a criminal conviction of the underlying
predicate acts.' 7 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling, and
concluded that nothing in the plain language of RICO limited civil liability to
those previously convicted of criminal racketeering activity.1 " The Bunker Ramo
RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law 55 [hereinafter
cited as ABA Report]); see also Note, Civil RICO and the Prior Criminal Conviction Requirement Has
the Second Circuit Drawn the Net Too Tightly, 60 WASH. L. REv. 461, 461 n.4, 464 n.23 (1985).

10. Sedima, S.P.R.L.Y. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 492 (2d Cir. 1984), rev d, 105 S. Ct.
3275 (1985). The court noted:
Four such limitations have been widely considered:
(1) Whether RICO requires some nexus between the challenged activity and organized
crime;
(2) whether the injury complained of must result from "enterprise" involvement in
the racketeering, rather than directly from the activity itself;
(3) whether plaintiffs must allege a "competitive" or "racketeering injury"; and
(4) whether there must be criminal convictions for the predicate acts underlying a civil
RICO suit.
Id.; see also, Bridges, Private RICO Litigation Based Upon "Fraud in the Sale of Securities," 18 GA. L.
REv. 43, 56 (1983); Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARv.
L. REv. 1101, 1105-15 (1982).

11.
12.

713 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1286-87.

13.

Id. at 1286.

14.
15.
16.

Id. at 1286-87.
18 U.S.C. 5 1964(c) (1982); see supra note 2.
713 F.2d at 1287.
17. Id. But see S.1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 6993 (1969) (Senator Hruska
stated: "Patterned closely after the Sherman Act, it[the Criminal Activities Profit Act] provides
for private treble damage suits, prospective injunctive relief, unlimited discovery procedures and
all the other devices which bring to bear the full panoply of our antitrust machinery in aid of the
businessman competing with organized crime").
18. 713 F.2d at 1287; see also USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy Inc., 689 F.2d 94,
95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982) (Bunker Court adopted the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Carbomin);
United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); Farmers
Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 4-52 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978) (section 1964(c) not premised
upon prior criminal convictions).
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court emphasized the congressional mandate that RICO be "liberally construed
to effectuate its remedial purpose." 9
In Furman v. Cirrito,20 the Second Circuit considered whether a distinct racketeering injury, beyond that caused by a violation of the predicate acts alone,
must be alleged to state a claim under section 1964(c). 2 1 Alleging the commission
of mail and wire fraud as predicate acts, the plaintiffs claimed that defendants'
pattern of racketeering activity caused injury to the plaintiffs' business and
property. 22 The defendants responded that RICO's primary purpose was to
eradicate organized crime rather than "garden variety" business fraud. 23 The
Second Circuit conceded RICO's primary aim was organized crime, but emphasized the underlying purposes of RICO equally mandated its applicability
to business fraud.2 4 Despite conclisding that neither the statutory language nor
the legislative history required a distinct racketeering injury, the Second Circuit
2
followed legal precedent making the element essential to a RICO claim. 1
The Seventh Circuit analyzed a trilogy of Second Circuit decisions imposing
distinct racketeering injury requirements 6 in Haroco v. American National Bank
& Trust Co. 27 The plaintiffs in Haroco alleged injuries to their business resulting
from interest overcharges. 28 The defendants argued that plaintiffs had failed to
plead the requisite nexus between their purported injuries and the alleged RICO

19. 713 F.2d at 1287 (citing USACO Coal Co. v. Carbimin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95
n.1 (6th Cir. 1982). The court relied on the approach of the court in United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981) (holding RICO shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purpose based on section 904(a) of Title IX, RICO, 84 Stat. 947). 713 F.2d at 1287.
20. 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985). The Furman opinion
expressed disagreement with the majority views of the Second Circuit panels in Sedima and Bankers
Trust Co. v. Rhoads, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985) and reaffirmed
the views expressed by the dissents in those two cases. Although the Furman court was unpersuaded
by the majority's ieasoning in the two prior cases, the court recognized these opinions as controlling.
741 F.2d at 525. The Furman panel held, therefore, that a plaintiff, in order to state a civil claim
under RICO, must allege a separate, distinct racketeering enterprise injury above and beyond
injury caused by predicate acts of racketeering. Id. at 525.
21. 741 F.2d at 527-33. Roughly half of the courts dealing with the issue have rejected the
racketeering injury requirement. See Comment,; Civil RICO: The Resolution of the Racketeering Enterprise
Injury Requirement, 21 CAL. W.L.. REV. 364, 368 n.28 (1985).
22. 741 F.2d at 526.
23. Id. at 528. The courts consistently refer to mail, wire and securities fraud collectively as
"garden variety fraud." See, e.g., Hulse v. Halle Farms Dev., 586 F. Supp. 120, 122 (D. Conn.
1984).
24. 741 F.2d at 528-29; see also Blakely, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on
Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME LAw. 237, 245-48 (1982).
25. 741 F.2d at 533; see supra note 20; see also Judgments in Four Civil RICO Cases Vacated in
Light of Court's Opinion Overturning, 1985 CIVIL RICO REPORT, (BNA) vol. 1, at 8.
26. The trilogy was decided on three successive days. Sedina, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741
F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985) was decided on July 25, 1984; Bankers
Trust Co. v. Rhoads, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985), was decided
on July 26, 1984; and Furman, 741 F.2d 524 (2d. Cir. 1984), was decided on July 27. All required
a distinct racketeering injury.
27. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aft'd, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
28. Id. at 385.
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violations, as required by Second Circuit decisions. Acknowledging the conflict
"
the Seventh Circuit ruled civil RICO plaintiffs need not
between circuits,
demonstrate injury beyond that to their business or property resulting from the
underlying racketeering acts."
The Haroco court expressly rejected the Second Circuit's finding that RICO
was designed to protect only indirect victims of racketeering activities. 12 Admitting the term "racketeering injury" was an elusive concept even to those
13
the Seventh Circuit refused to limit civil RIcourts recognizing its viability,
CO's application to those persons who suffered only consequential or remote
injuries from racketeering activities. " The court emphasized that RICO's legislative history evidenced a congressional desire to avoid creating loopholes that
clever defendants could exploit " Conceding that Congress may not have anticipated the overinclusive effect of RICO, the Haroco court nonetheless concluded that policy reasons mandated disapproval of the limitations imposed by

the Second Circuit cases. ."'I
In the instant case, the Supreme Court refused to limit civil RICO by
7
requiring a prior criminal conviction or a distinct racketeering injury) Reversing the Second Circuit,' the Court reviewed RICO's statutory language,
9
legislative history, and underlying policy considerations.' Writing for the ma1
jority, Justice White relied on the plain language of the Act and emphasized
' 4
purpose. '
remedial
its
effectuate
to
that RICO should be "liberally construed

29. Id. at 386.
30. Id. at 388. No clear weight of authority exists at the district court level either for or
against the racketeering injury requirement. See supra note 21.
31. 747 F.2d at 405.
32. Id. at 391-94. For further discussion, see Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508-09 (1983).
33. 747 F.2d at 389; see, eg., Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 742 F.2d 408, 413
(8th Cir. 1984) (defining racketeering injury as a slippery concept), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985);
Willamette Savings & Loan v. Blake & Neal Finance Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1430 (D. Or. 1984)
(the courts will recognize a racketeering enterprise injury when they see one); Kaufman v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 581 F.Supp. 350, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (racketeering enterprise injury is something more than direct injury from the predicate acts).
34. 747 F.2d at 392.
35. Id. at 390.
36. Id. at 399. The court stated, "[I1t does not seem at all likely that Congress anticipated
the application of civil RICO to improperly calculated interest charges by a commercial bank.
Congress appears to have preferred a broad statute, even if overinclusion might result." Id.
37. 105 S. Ct. at 3284-86. The 5-4 lineup was particularly ironic. In the majority, refusing
to rescue legitim".te businessmen who have become the most frequent targets of civil RICO suits,
were the conservative, generally pro-business justices; dissenting were the three most liberal, normally "pro-plaintiff" justices and centrist Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. See Lacovara, Justices Rebuffed
Tries to Limit Sweep of RICO, Nat'l L.J., Sept 2, 1985, at S-18, col. 1.
38. 105 S. Ct. at 3287. The Supreme Court, viewing the lower court's decision as consistent
with Sedima, also affirmed the Seventh Circuit companion case, Haroco, on the same day. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Haroco, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
39. Id. at 3278-88.
40. Id. at 3281; see also RICO, Pari Delicto, Deception and the Supreme Court, 7 SEc. & FED'.
CORP.'L. REP. (CLARK BOARDMAN) no. 7, at 50 (July-Aug. 1985).
105 S. Ct. at 3286; see also Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587.
41.
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Although the majority acknowledged the lower court's concern over the effect
of an expansive reading of RICO, the Court, nevertheless, rejected the limitations imposed by the Second Circuit.4 2 However, the majority declined to
acts or whether
ascertain whether the defendants committed the alleged predicate
43
commission of those acts constituted racketeering activity.
The instant Court echoed the Seventh Circuit's conclusion in Bunker Ramo
that the term "violation" in section 1964(c) did not imply a criminal conviction. 4 The Court reasoned that even if the Act were construed to require
a criminal conviction, it would require a conviction under criminal RICO and
not section 1961's predicate acts. 45 The Court based its reasoning on the absence
of any reference to this novel requirement in either the legislative history of
RICO or the Act itself.46 The Court determined the legislative history of the
Act contained nothing to contradict the clear import of the language and was
otherwise silent. 47 Examining the underlying policies of RICO, the Court considered the prior criminal conviction requirement contrary to congressional policy concerns. 4 Comparing civil RICO to other private attorney general provisions,
the Court concluded that imposing such a limitation would destroy the underlying purposes of civil RICO.4 9 The Court further observed that the prior
criminal conviction requirement would render the treble damage provision unjustified if liability under civil RICO were limited to those already convicted
of the underlying criminal offenses. 50 Finding the prior criminal conviction requirement unsupported by the Act's language and legislative history, the Court
ruled the requirement invalid. 5'
Evaluating the second prerequisite imposed by the Second Circuit, the instant Court again regarded the statutory language and legislative history of civil
RICO as contrary to the lower court's holding.5 2 The Court noted the difficulty
involved in defining a "racketeering injury." 53 Given this difficulty, the Court
cautioned against imposing such a limitation on civil RICO actions.5 4 Section
1961(1), defining "racketeering activity" as the commission of a predicate act,
further underpinned the Court's hesitancy to demand a separate racketeering

42. 105 S.Ct. at 3278.
43. Id. at 3287. The Court stated the pattern issue was not the question before the Court
on certiorari. Id. The Court addressed the pattern concept in depth, recognizing the patent ambiguity of the definition of a "pattern of racketeering activity" and the implication is that while
two acts are necessary, they may not be enough. Id at 3285 n. 14.
44. Id. at 3284. The Court noted that "racketeering activity consists not of acts for which
the defendant has been convicted, but of acts for which he could be." Id. at 3281.
45. Id.; see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) (relied upon by the instant
court).
46.

105 S. Ct. at 3282.

47. Id.
48. Id. at 3284; see also Legal Times, Aug. 1985, at 16, col. 2.
49. 105 S. Ct. at 3284.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 3284-87; see Legal Times, supra note 48, at 16, col. 3.
53. 105 S.Ct. at 3284; see also Haroco, 747 F.2d at 389.
54. 105 S.Ct. at 3284; see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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injury. 5 - Section 1962 provides a private right of action to any person injured
in his business or property through the conduct of an enterprise engaged in a
pattern of racketeering activity. 6 Accordingly, the Court reasoned the harm
57
resulting from the predicate acts represented the compensable injury.
In dissent, Justice Powell criticized the majority for failing to define what
conduct constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. 5 Expressing concern over
RICO's expansive interpretation, he emphasized that RICO's application against
respected businessmen exceeded its use against those guilty of traditional mobster
and racketeering activity. 5- Justice Powell, therefore, urged the Court to adopt
the ABA Task Force recommendation narrowly construing the "pattern" ele11
6
ment of RICO.
Enforcing laws designed to deter conduct that endangers the legitimate operation of businesses is a paramount judicial function. Performing this function,
the instant Court carefully interpreted and implemented the congressional intent
underlying civil RICO. The majority recognized that judicial curtailment of
civil RICO stemmed from the lower courts' discomfort with the Act's potential
expansion of federal jurisdiction. 6 ' However, the lower courts overlooked the
clearly articulated congressional intention to include white collar crime within
civil RICO. 6 2 The current pervasiveness of white collar crime has effectively
expanded civil RICO's application.6" The instant Court reasoned that civil RICO's potential impact should not be thwarted by judicially-created limitations
imposed out of concern for expanded federal jurisdiction.
Concurring with the reasoning in Bunker Ramo, the Court declined to read
a criminal conviction requirement into the statute. 64 Although Congress failed
55.

105 S. Ct. at 3285; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
56. 18 U.S.C. 5 1964(c) (1982); see also supra note 2.
57. 105 S. Ct. at 3286.
58. Id. at 3290. Justice Powell did not examine either of the two civil RICO limitations
imposed by the circuit court. Id. at 3288-91. He did mention the racketeering injury requirement
in a cursory fashion, but only to further illustrate his point that the difficult "pattern" issue was
not confronted in this decision. Id. Justice Marshall authored a dissenting opinion for both Sedima
and Haroco. This opinion focused on policy considerations underlying civil RICO and inadequately
articulated sufficient support for the dissenting position. Id. at 3293-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 3289 (Powell, J., dissenting).
60. Id. The pattern element was designed to limit its application to planned, ongoing, continuing crime, as opposed to sporadic, unrelated, isolated criminal episodes. See ABA Report supra
note 9, at 72. The pattern should be interpreted as requiring: (1) the racketeering acts be related
to each other; (2) they be part of some common scheme; and (3) there be some sort of continuity
between the acts or a threat of continuing criminal activity. Id. at 193-208.
61. See Comment, supra note 21, at 383; see also Comment, Sedima v. Imrex: Civil Immunity
for Unprosecuted RICO Violators? 85 COLUM L. REv. 419, 422 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Civil Immunity]; Note, supra note 9, at 466-67.
62. See Comment, supra note 21, at 383; see also S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 215
(1969).
63. See Comment, supra note 21, at 383.
64. 105 S. Ct. at 3284; see also Note, Civil RICO: Prior Criminal Conviction and Burden of Proof,
60 NOTRE DAME LAW. 567, 575 (1985).
By imposing the conviction requirement, the Sedima court overlooked important policy
considerations, including: 1) the existence of sufficient legal tools to prevent frivolous suits,
2) the inappropriateness of restricting a statute because of workload concerns, 3) the in-
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to define a "violation," the Court did not regard the term as synonymous with
a "conviction." 6 5 The Court observed the word "conviction" did not appear
in any relevant portion of the statute.6 The legislative history provided equally
persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend the statute to require prior
67
criminal convictions.
The Court expressed concern that the prior criminal conviction requirement
68
would create significant barriers for many civil RICO plaintiffs. Emphasizing
that the time and costs involved in a criminal trial warranted consideration,
the Court explained that such a restriction arbitrarily limited the availability
69
of private actions against lawbreakers who often go unapprehended. Accordingly, the majority declared that the prior criminal conviction requirement nullified the private attorney general concept relied upon by Congress in constructing
civil RICO. 70.
The Furman opinion provides further support for the majority's decision.
Despite vigorous disagreement with the Second Circuit's imposition of a racketeering injury restriction, the Furman court felt compelled by stare decisis to
rule against its own reasoning. 7' This opinion foreshadowed the shortlived reign
of such judicially imposed restrictions. Only months later, the Seventh Circuit
panel and refused to
in Haroco expressed disagreements similar to the Furman
72
follow the- trilogy of Second Circuit civil RICO cases.
Following a thorough and persuasive analysis of the plain language and
legislative history of the Act, the majority rejected the racketeering injury ele73
The Court was unimment as amorphous, indefinite, and unsubstantiated.
pressed by the lower court's concern that section 1964(c) might be used against
respected businesses allegedly engaged in a pattern of specifically identifiable
criminal conduct. The Court predicated its conclusion on the inadequacy of
74
evidence demonstrating the provision was being misconstrued. The Supreme
Court's decision terminated unbased judicial attempts to thwart civil RICO's
impact by narrowly construing section 1964(c) to require a racketeering injury.
Heeding Congress' express admonition that RICO should be liberally construed, the Supreme Court suggested a narrow reading of the Act would ef-

appropriateness of denying a plaintiff access to court because of matters that preclude

conviction, but that are unrelated to the validity of the civil claim, and 4) the detrimental
effect of such a requirement on the criminal justice system.

Id.
65.

See Note, supra note 9, at 474-75; see also Comment, Civil Immunity supra note 61, at 430-

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

105 S. Ct. at 3281.
Id. at 3282; see also Note, supra note 9, at 477 n.99.
105 S. Ct. at 3284; see also Note, supra note 9, at 477.
105 S. Ct, at 3284; see also Note, supra note 9, at 478-79.
105 S. Ct. at 3284. For further support of the majority's rejection of criminal conviction

31.

requirements, see Nat'l L.J., Aug. 26, 1985 at 25, col. 4 (even the minority declined to defend
it).
71. 741 F.2d at 524-25.
72. 747 F.2d at 399.
73. 105 S. Ct. at 3278-88.
74. Id. at 3287.
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fectively eliminate section 1964(c). " The "liberal construction" mandate further
supported the Court's view that Congress intended RICO to supplement old
remedies and develop new methods for fighting crime.' 6 The majority conceded
that an expansive reading of civil RICO might cause it to develop into something "more" than was originally intended; however, the Court ruled that
Congress must impose any restriction that falls outside the plain language of
7
the Act.'
The Supreme Court correctly analyzed and implemented the congressional
policies underpinning civil RICO by rejecting the Second Circuit's judicially
created restrictions. However, the majority's refusal to define the phrase "pattern of racketeering activity" will engender more uncertainty in the lower courts
regarding the proper application of civil RICO.' Apart from this unresolved
question, the Court's decision is unequivocal; the congressional mandate that
RICO be liberally construed to facilitate its remedial purpose requires a broad
reading of the Act. The Court obviated the Second Circuit's requirements of
a prior criminal conviction and a distinct racketeering injury, as these requirements lacked support in the plain language of the Act, its legislative history,
and its underlying policies. Unimpressed by the lower court's concern that civil
RICO might be used against respected businesses, the Court firmly established
that white collar crime is sufficiently pervasive to warrant a potent federal RICO
remedy. Relinquishing control of the statute, the Court properly charged Congress with the responsibility of restricting or amending civil RICO's present
import.
E. LANIER

DREW

75. Id. at 3286.
76. Id. See generally Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (discussing the legislative
history of RICO).
77. 105 S. Ct. at 3287. Already, bills have been introduced which would amend the provisions
of civil RICO. See, e.g., Senate Bill to Amend Civil RICO By Limiting Definition of Pattern Injuy, Civil.
RICO REPoRT (BNA), Aug. 7, 1985, vol. 1 no. 10 at 3. A Senate Bill (S1521) introduced in the
Senate July 29th would amend 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) with respect to civil remedies for persons
suffering competitive or business injuries as a result of racketeering activity. S. 1521, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985). House Bill (HR 2943) is designed to "clarify congressional intent" regarding the
applicability of civil RICO but would seek to do so by imposing a criminal conviction requirement
for prospective defendants. H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985).
78. Justice Powell intimates the lower courts desiring to limit RICO's expansive interpretation
should focus on the pattern issue. See Nat'l L.J., Aug. 26, 1985, at 36, col. 4.
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